Click any column header to sort table data.
| 1 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How should the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and Maritime Security Program be recapitalized to meet Indo-Pacific surge requirements given a 50%+ degraded readiness baseline? |
| 2 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How does severe degradation of communications compound the problems of contested logistics in a CBR contaminated environment and how do we prepare for it? |
| 3 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How can micro-reactors, tactical solar, and synthetic fuel production reduce the operational energy demand signature of forward bases? |
| 4 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How must existing regional support frameworks within INDOPACOM or EUCOM evolve to optimize joint and coalition operations, shared logistics, and host-nation support in a contested environment? |
| 5 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How should the role of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) evolve to lead theater contested logistics? |
| 6 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | What expeditionary water generation (atmospheric, desalination) requirements support distributed operations across Pacific atolls and Arctic outposts? |
| 7 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How can the Marine Corps formalize different types of Expeditionary Advance Bases, including Sensing, Strike, Staging, and Support, to meet the needs of the Joint Force? |
| 8 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | What mission areas are appropriate for in-space manufacturing? Is this economically and militarily useful? |
| 9 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How does the DoW overcome limitations related to the inability to share information with the Interagency, Allies & Partners, and Industry partners, that prevents national-level coordination, synchronization, deconfliction, and prioritization for commercial demand signals before a crisis manifests, to allow for targeted investment strategies on those critical dependencies at scale. |
| 10 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How should pre-positioned stocks (APS-3 afloat, Marine Corps Prepositioning) be re-postured west of the International Date Line to survive a Day-1 PLA strike? |
| 11 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | What would a quantitative analysis of DLA's most critical single-source dependencies and the development of a prioritized playbook for mitigating these high-risk areas look like? |
| 12 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How do we ensure prepositioned stocks are properly setting a theater (right location, funded, and coordinated across other services)? |
| 13 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How can the Joint Force best use internal and external resources to guarantee logistical supply and distribution in a multi-front conflict characterized by large geographic separation with limited access? |
| 14 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How can the Department of War and its interagency partners dynamically prioritize and manage contested domestic logistics infrastructure to balance urgent military mobilization with civilian critical infrastructure survival? |
| 15 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How do evolving mission sets and their rates of change dictate infrastructure requirements, and how can the Department of War better align infrastructure lifespans to directly match the specific missions they support? |
| 16 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | How are operational level commands and JTF's organizing to focus on the link between the logistics and intelligence warfighting functions? |
| 17 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | What are the current joint over-the-shore capabilities of the services to receive petroleum? How do those capabilities rank against risk factors of survivability, capability, speed of emplacement, redeployment, and cost to benefit. What are the commercial capabilities available and how do they rank against those same risk factors? |
| 18 | Logistics, Sustainment, and Supply Chain | Based on lessons learned and AAR data, how should the U.S. Army reshape tactical level ammunition supply, storage, and distribution operations to improve asset survivability and increase responsiveness in contested environments? |
| 19 | Medical and Force Health Protection | How can the Joint Force optimize the availability, cost-effectiveness, shelf life, and improve the survivability of the freeze-dried plasma containers to facilitate its comprehensive integration into standard battlefield casualty care? |
| 20 | Medical and Force Health Protection | How do we support Food and Drug Administration intent for protection balancing mission and partner FDA-like capabilities? |
| 21 | Medical and Force Health Protection | How can the Joint Force doctrinally and logistically establish a standardized, rapidly deployable "Medical Bridge" capability to provide sustained (30-45 day) sick-call and TCCC stabilization for up to 500 personnel, bridging the gap from initial deployment until a formal Role 1 or pre-positioned UTC is established? |
| 22 | Medical and Force Health Protection | What is the role of telemedicine, AI triage, and autonomous CASEVAC (ground/air) in degraded comms environments? |
| 23 | Medical and Force Health Protection | What blood product supply chain (walking blood banks, freeze-dried plasma, lyophilized) is needed when Golden Hour MEDEVAC is unavailable for 24-72 hours? |
| 24 | Medical and Force Health Protection | How can the Department of the Air Force streamline the PRP administrative, medical, and continuous evaluation pipelines potentially by leveraging secure data analytics, centralized adjudication models, or policy reform to reduce clearance timelines and sustain a robust, reliable pool of certified personnel without compromising stringent nuclear surety standards? |
| 25 | Medical and Force Health Protection | How can the Joint Force doctrinally and logistically establish a standardized, rapidly deployable "Medical Bridge" capability to provide sustained (30-45 day) sick-call and TCCC stabilization for up to 500 personnel, bridging the gap from initial deployment until a formal Role 1 or pre-positioned UTC is established? |